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Terms of reference 
  
This report analyses the use of different share classes in Europe with 
a focus on the pharmaceutical industry and analyses the relationship 
between ownership structure and firms’ economic performance. 
 
The report is ordered and financed by Novo A/S. 
 
The project has been supervised by a steering committee whose 
members are Morten Bennedsen and Kasper Meisner Nielsen. Besides, 
Joachim Sperling and Thorkil Kastberg Christensen have supervised 
the project on behalf of Novo A/S. The report has been completed 
over the period February 2007 to April 2007. 
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Executive summary 
 
Firms in the European countries today have the possibility of choosing 
from a range of control enhancing mechanisms giving the controlling 
owners an amount of influence which is disproportional to their share 
of cash flow. The list of control enhancing mechanisms includes dual 
class shares, pyramidal ownership structures and several others. 
 
The justification for these control enhancing mechanisms is currently 
the subject of much debate within the European Union. The opposing 
positions in the debate can be stated briefly as i) the control 
enhancing mechanisms are an impediment to takeovers and should 
therefore be removed to improve the market for corporate control. ii) 
Removing the control enhancing mechanisms reduces the contractual 
freedom to decide desirable ownership structures. 
 
This report investigates whether ownership structures affect firm per-
formance. To do so this study provides a description of the current 
ownership structures in European countries and the economic 
outcomes for firms using different ownership structures. 
 
The results are presented in the tables below. SUMMARY TABLE 1 
illustrates that the use of control enhancing mechanisms varies much 
across the European countries. In particular, the Scandinavian coun-
tries, UK, Italy and Belgium tend to use disproportional ownership 
structures more than the average European country. This difference is 
driven by the frequent use of dual class shares in Scandinavia. 
 
SUMMARY TABLE 2 shows how the different types of ownership struc-
tures are used across Europe. Proportional ownership refers to the si-
tuation without control enhancing mechanisms are used, dispropor-
tional refers to all types of control enhancing mechanisms, and dual 
class share and pyramids are two specific forms of control enhancing 
mechanisms.  
SUMMARY TABLE 2 shows that overall, firms with disproportional 
ownership structures tend to be more research and development 
intensive, measured by research and development expenditure 
relative to value added. For example, the R&D intensity of 
corporations with proportional ownership is 2.7 per cent in the third 
quartile, while it is 5.8 per cent for those with disproportional 
ownership. 
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SUMMARY TABLE 1 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
   All   Disproportional mechanism 
  Firms  All  Dual Class Shares  Pyramids 
     N   N Share   N Share   N Share 
Austria  82  34 0.41  18 0.22  19 0.23 
Belgium  81  27 0.33  0 0.00  22 0.27 
Denmark 152  71 0.47  45 0.30  27 0.18 
Finland  94  52 0.55  42 0.45  7 0.07 
France  456  76 0.17  10 0.02  67 0.15 
Germany 548  215 0.39  101 0.18  130 0.24 
Ireland  54  21 0.39  13 0.24  9 0.17 
Italy  153  83 0.54  63 0.41  38 0.25 
Norway  126  54 0.43  12 0.10  44 0.35 
Portugal  69  8 0.12  0 0.00  8 0.12 
Spain  136  27 0.20  0 0.00  24 0.18 
Sweden  170  123 0.72  100 0.59  48 0.28 
UK  1,486  623 0.42  376 0.25  318 0.21 
All   3,607   1414 0.39   780 0.22   761 0.21 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
SUMMARY TABLE 2 R&D INTENSITY AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
 Quartiles of R&D intensity 
 1th 2nd 3rd 
Proportional 0.0017 0.0073 0.0265 
Disproportional 0.0020 0.0079 0.0577 
Dual class share 0.0015 0.0087 0.0578 
Pyramids 0.0021 0.0075 0.0623 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The main result is that the effects of disproportional ownership are 
mixed, as shown in SUMMARY TABLE 3. Firms which use disproportional 
mechanisms have a lower market value than comparable firms with 
proportional ownership. When performance is measured by the return 
on assets there is no significant effect of disproportional ownership. 
However, the growth of the market-to-book ratio is higher for 
disproportionally owned firms than for proportionally owned firms. 
Finally, the growth in sales and employment of disproportionally 
owned firms appears to be lower than that of comparable 
proportionally owned firms. An important caveat to the interpretation 
of these results is that ownership information is only available for 
1996-1999 for this project, which means that the growth in market 
value and assets could be due to either improved operating perfor-
mance or a change in ownership structure or both, and we cannot dis-
tinguish between the reasons on the basis of the available data. 
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The findings for firms in general do not extend to the pharmaceutical 
industry. For this industry, disproportional ownership is not associated 
with any statistically significant effect on the market-to-book ratio. On 
the other hand, disproportionally owned firms have a higher return on 
assets than comparable firms which have proportional ownership. 
There is no significant difference in the growth of the market-to-book 
ratio between disproportionally and proportionally owned firms. 
Finally, for the pharmaceutical industry there is no effect of 
disproportional ownership on the growth rate of sales and 
employment. One caveat to these results is that the number of 
pharmaceutical firms is modest.1 
 
The results of the analyses in this report indicate that one cannot on 
the basis of existing data draw any general conclusions on whether 
disproportional ownership is good or bad for firms. On average firms 
with disproportional ownership have a lower market-to-book value 
than firms with proportional ownership. The result appears to be 
generated by firms in low and medium technology industries, as it 
does not extend to high tech industries. Similarly, the effect of 
disproportional ownership on operating performance depends on 
which measure of operating performance is used and which industries 
are considered. Finally, on average firms with disproportional owner-
ship experience lower employment and sales growth than firms with 
proportional ownership, but only in low tech industries. 
 
SUMMARY TABLE 3 EFFECT OF DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP ON 
DIFFERENT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
  
Market to  
Book ratio 
Return on  
assets 
Sales  
growth 
Employment  
growth 
Market 
value 
growth
Dispropor- 
tional -0.091 0.003 -0.026 -0.023 0.010
 (4.73) (1.12) (3.79) (3.41) (1.76) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. A t-value above approximately 1.97 indicates that 
a result is statistically significant – that is, the finding is so strong that is overcomes the 
statistical uncertainty associated with the analysis. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
                                          
 
 
1 Analyses have also been made of the effect of disproportional ownership for high-tech firms. For 
this range of industries no statistically significant relationship of disproportional ownership on any of 
the indicators of value, performance and growth could be found. 
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SUMMARY TABLE 4 EFFECT OF DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP ON 
DIFFERENT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS – THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
  
Market to  
book ratio 
Return on 
assets 
Sales  
growth 
Employment
Growth 
Market 
value 
growth 
Dispropor- 
tional 0.199 0.101 -0.105 0.008 0.015 
 (0.65) (3.25) (0.93) (0.15) (0.20) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. A t-value above approximately 1.97 indicates that 
a result is statistically significant – that is, the finding is so strong that is overcomes the 
statistical uncertainty associated with the analysis. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
As such, the findings of this report raise some interesting points to 
consider in the European debate on the regulation of ownership 
structures and important topics for future research. 
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1 Introduction 
 
A variety of control enhancing mechanisms are available to publicly 
traded corporations in Europe. These takes the form of chains of 
ownership (pyramidal structures), multiple voting rights, voting right 
ceilings, priority (or preference) shares, depositary receipts and non-
voting shares, among others. 
 
In its 2003 Action Plan, the European Commission considers that 
there is a medium to long-term case for doing away with, or at least 
discouraging, undesirable control arrangements. This has initiated a 
European debate on the pros and cons of control enhancing 
mechanisms. As an input to this debate this study aims at providing a 
picture of the current ownership structures in European countries and 
on the economic consequences of particular modes of organizing the 
ownership of firms. 
 
The first part of the study provides a descriptive picture of the 
ownership of European firms. The aim is to provide a detailed 
overview of the use of mechanisms which firms use to separate 
control and income rights across European countries. Moreover, a 
central part of this analysis focuses on the main characteristics of 
disproportional ownership structures with a focus on Scandinavia.  
 
The second part of the report investigates the economic consequences 
of having ownership structures that separates the distribution of 
control and income rights. The economic consequences of 
disproportional ownership structures are assessed using a range of 
indicators. Among these are firm value (market-to-book ratio), 
operating performance, sales and employment growth, and growth in 
firm value (market to book ratio). The analysis both provides a link 
between disproportional ownership and firm outcomes, as well as the 
effect on performance of the underlying mechanisms that creates the 
separation between income and cash flows rights. Finally, the analysis 
examines the effects of disproportional ownership structures on firms 
in research and development intensive industries and high tech 
industries.  
 
The third part of the report focuses on the pharmaceutical industry. 
The pharmaceutical industry is interesting for at least three reasons: 
First, it is one of the most important sectors in Scandinavia as well as 
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in the rest of Europe. Second, the industry is characterised by having 
a high research and development intensity. Third, the industry has 
witnessed significant growth rates over the last decades.  This part of 
the report compares the ownership structure of pharmaceutical firms 
to firms outside the pharmaceutical industry, and analyzes the 
differences in performance and growth for pharmaceutical firms as 
well as non-pharmaceutical firms with and without disproportional 
ownership structures.  
  
The broad picture that we develop in this report is that there is a 
significant variation in the way that European firms are organized. 
Thus, the report provides valuable insights to the ongoing discussion 
of the desirability of only allowing one specific ownership structure – 
that is, proportional ownership - within the European Union. 
Moreover, to facilitate the discussion the appendix provides the 
interested party with a list of the 100 largest European firms with 
disproportional ownership structures as well as list of pharmaceutical 
companies included in the analysis. 
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2 Data 
 
Analysing the link between ownership structures, firms’ economic 
situation and R&D requires highly specialised data. This chapter is 
intended to inform the interested reader on how the data is collected 
and constructed.  
 
2.1 Sources 
Ownership data are drawn from Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006), which 
is an updated file of Faccio and Lang (2002). These data are collected 
on 14 countries2 and cover almost all listed firms (see Faccio and Lang 
(2002) for coverage rates). The sample consists of information on 
ultimate ownership for the period 1996 to 1999.  
 
Financial information is drawn from Worldscope, which is available 
from Thomson Financial in electronic form. The Worldscope database 
contains accounting information on public firms, which is comparable 
across countries, for more than 50 countries in the world. Financial 
information is drawn for 1995-2004. 
  
The matched sample of ownership and financial information consists 
of 3,607 firms with approximately 22,000 firm-year observations from 
13 countries.3 On average each firm’s financial information is available 
for 6.1 years. From this sample small firms are removed. The 
following observations were excluded: firms with current or lagged 
total assets less than one million dollars or missing (lagged) total 
assets. The main reason for this omission is that most of the variables 
in the empirical model are ratios of either current or lagged total 
assets and small values of total assets increase the number of 
outliers. 
 
                                          
 
 
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
3 Matching is achieved by company name. The initial match in Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006) 
between ownership and financial information for 1996-1998 from Worldscope contains 4.410 firms. 
Two main reasons can be given for the fewer firms in the current sample. First, a match for 
Switzerland was impossible. Second, the focus on the period 1995-2004 reduces the number of 
firms due to bankruptcy, delistings, and merger and acquisition activity. 
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The final piece of information is research and development (R&D) 
intensity on industry and country level. Data are drawn from the 
OECD data base, STAN, which groups R&D for 11 of the countries in 
the sample for the period 1995 to 2003. The R&D data was merged in 
the sample by industry, country and year. 
 
2.2 Ownership variables 
Disproportional ownership structures allow the controlling owners to 
separate control (votes) from income rights. To measure the degree 
of disproportional ownership attention is given to firms where the 
largest ultimate owner possesses at least 10 per cent of the votes 
(except for firms with dual class shares, cf. below). This threshold 
follows the literature and reflects the idea that influential control can 
be achieved with less than complete control (i.e. more than 50 per 
cent of the votes). 4 Three types of disproportional mechanisms are 
distinguished. 
 
First, all firms with dual class shares (DCS) are classified as having 
disproportional ownership. Since all firms with DCS are classified as a 
disproportional ownership irrespective of the largest owner’s stake of 
votes, it is the only group where the largest controlling owner can 
possess less than 10 per cent control. Variation in restrictions on DCS 
is given in Chapter 3.5 
 
Second, firms have a pyramidal structure when the ultimate owner 
controls the firm through another firm.6 Again it is assumed that 10 
per cent of the votes are necessary to control the firm. For example, if 
family X owns 20 percent of stocks in firm A, which again owns 40 per 
cent of stocks in firm B. Firm B is classified as a firm with pyramidal 
ownership. The largest owner, family X, possesses 20 per cent of the 
                                          
 
 
4 In Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006) results are provided with attention on the group of large 
shareholders (defined as the sum of individual owners with more than 10 per cent of the votes) 
without significant changes in results.  
5 In this report we analyze among other things the value of dual class share firms. This is difficult, 
because not all superior voting shares are valued in the market. To take the value of superior voting 
shares for these firms into account, we assume that the price of a superior voting share equals the 
price of limited voting shares. 
6 The ultimate owner is e.g. a family, fund or government. 
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votes (weakest link in control chain is 20 per cent) of firm B and 8 per 
cent of the income right (0.2 multiplied by 0.4)7. 
 
Third, a group labelled other disproportional ownership structures 
(ODP) is derived. This group consists of firms with cross ownership, 
which is when a firm A is controlled by another firm B that is 
controlled by A. Again the control chain requires at least 10 per cent 
control. The group also consists of all firms where the largest owner 
has more control than income rights, but where the separation of 
control and income rights was achieved with other mechanism, e.g. 
golden shares and voting caps. The data do not allow a distinction 
between these other mechanisms. 
 
2.3 Industry affiliation 
The final issue in this chapter is industry affiliation. This is important 
because Chapter 5 focuses on pharmaceutical firms and R&D intensity 
is at the country and industry level. The industry affiliation of firms is 
based on net sales and relates to October 2005. Firms are allocated to 
4 digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in Worldscope. 
  
For this reason and the reason that the pharmaceutical sector is quite 
small, we adopt a slightly broader definition of pharmaceutical 
industry from the Nordic Stock Exchange, where the group ‘Health 
Care’ is used to identify SIC codes where firms have health as primary 
activity. Chapter 5 contains a complete list of SIC codes. 
 
R&D intensity (R&D expenditures divided by gross value added) data 
from OECD are available by country, industry and year. These are 
available for all countries except Austria and Portugal. Finally, R&D 
intensity is available on ISIC revision 3.1, which is the United Nation 
industry classification. By use of a correspondence table between SIC 
and ISIC codes, R&D intensity were merged into the ownership and 
financial database by industry, year, and country. 8 
                                          
 
 
7 Note 100 percent control of the votes in a control chain is a subsidiary and not a pyramid. 
8 This mapping between classifications can lead to misclassifications of firms. But as long R&D 
intensity is approximately of the same order, the problem of misclassification is relatively small. 
Moreover in the empirical model with R&D intensity as explanatory variable the analysis is restricted 
to manufacturing, where the classification bias is smaller.  
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3 Ownership structures in Europe 
 
This chapter discusses ownership structures in Europe or more 
precisely for the 13 countries in the sample. First, the distribution of 
dual class share and pyramidal firms across countries is discussed. 
Second, the combined effect of disproportional ownership and 
distribution of control and income rights is accessed. Third, other 
disproportional mechanisms, which are less common, are 
investigated. Fourth, focusing on origin of company law, the 
characteristics of Scandinavia is investigated. Finally, a discussion of 
why firms are using disproportional mechanisms ends this chapter. 
 
Ownership structures will be classified by type of disproportional 
mechanisms. Dual class shares (DCS) and pyramids (PYR) are the 
main disproportional mechanisms firms apply to separate control and 
income rights. Other mechanisms are grouped under other 
disproportionality mechanisms (ODP). TABLE 3.1 provides evidence of 
the differences in disproportional ownership across countries. On 
average 39 per cent of the firms have one or more forms of 
disproportional ownership.  
 
3.1 Dual class shares and pyramids in 
Europe 
TABLE 3.1 shows that nearly half of the firms in the sample are located 
in the UK. Instead of focusing on the number of firms, which to some 
extent reflects the size of countries, the share of firms with 
disproportional ownership structure relative to the total number of 
firms will be the centre of attention.  
 
TABLE 3.1 shows that the share of listed firms with dual class shares is 
0.22 and the share with pyramidal ownership of all firms is 0.21. 
Overall the share of disproportionally owned firms is 0.39 including 
other disproportional mechanism, which indicates a small overlap in 
firms having dual class shares, pyramids or other mechanisms. The 
variation in the fraction of firms with disproportional ownership is 
quite high across countries. In Sweden 72 per cent of all firms have 
disproportional ownership compared to only 12 per cent in Portugal. 
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TABLE 3.1 NUMBER AND SHARES OF ALL FIRMS WITH MECHANISMS 
SEPARATING CONTROL AND INCOME RIGHTS ACROSS EUROPE 
   All   Disproportional mechanism 
  Firms  All  Dual Class Shares  Pyramids 
     N   N Share   N Share   N Share 
Austria  82  34 0.41  18 0.22  19 0.23 
Belgium  81  27 0.33  0 0.00  22 0.27 
Denmark 152  71 0.47  45 0.30  27 0.18 
Finland  94  52 0.55  42 0.45  7 0.07 
France  456  76 0.17  10 0.02  67 0.15 
Germany 548  215 0.39  101 0.18  130 0.24 
Ireland  54  21 0.39  13 0.24  9 0.17 
Italy  153  83 0.54  63 0.41  38 0.25 
Norway  126  54 0.43  12 0.10  44 0.35 
Portugal  69  8 0.12  0 0.00  8 0.12 
Spain  136  27 0.20  0 0.00  24 0.18 
Sweden  170  123 0.72  100 0.59  48 0.28 
UK  1,486  623 0.42  376 0.25  318 0.21 
All   3,607   1414 0.39   780 0.22   761 0.21 
Source: Own calculation. 
 
Sweden is followed by Finland (55 per cent), Italy (54 per cent) and 
Denmark (47 per cent). At the bottom of the scale, France (17 per 
cent) and Spain (20 per cent) are close to Portugal, which has the 
lowest level of disproportional mechanisms in the sample. Although 
some of the variation can be expected to arise from the sample 
selection, evidence in Faccio and Lang (2002) for all listed firms and 
Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006) point in the same direction. 
 
The choice of mechanism to separate control from income rights 
varies much across countries as well. However, the dispersion seems 
to originate mainly from differences in the share of firms with dual 
class shares. On the one hand Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Italy 
have the largest share of firms with dual class shares and these 
countries also have the overall highest proportion of firms with 
disproportional ownership structures. On the other hand, pyramids 
are distributed somewhat more equally across countries. No clear 
pattern emerges from comparing pyramidal ownership and dual class 
shares across countries, a simple correlation coefficient across 
proportions reveals a very weak negative correlation.  
 
Country specific restrictions on the use of dual class shares can be 
expected to explain some of the cross country differences. Countries 
like Belgium and Norway have implemented the one-share one-vote 
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rule, which can be directly observed in the data. In Belgium there are 
no firms with dual class shares, whereas in Norway a small number 
exists, as the government can approve deviations from the general 
one-share one-vote rule. In France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain the non-voting (or limited voting) shares cannot exceed 50 
percent (25 percent for France) of the nominal share capital. 
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have implemented a maximum voting 
ratio of 10 to 1 between superior and limited voting shares. Non-
voting shares have been outlawed in the UK since 1968. Finally, the 
corporate law in Austria and Ireland do not impose any restrictions on 
the use of dual class shares. Notice that the legal restrictions 
discussed above are current restrictions, due to ‘grandfathering’ 
clauses the actual variation across countries can be somewhat higher. 
 
In Chapter 4, the effect of disproportional ownership on firms’ 
economic outcomes is assessed. It is important to underline that dis-
proportional ownership structures are relatively stable over time 
(Faccio and Lang (2002) p. 368) and therefore can be used to explain 
performance of firms over a long period. Moreover, the analysis is 
extended to cover each mechanism’s effect on performance.  
 
In addition to the cross-country variation, firm characteristics such as 
firm size or R&D intensity, might explain differences in which firms 
have implemented disproportional ownership structures. 
 
TABLE 3.2 shows the share of firms with disproportional ownership 
structures for small and large firms, when we split the sample into 
two according to the median firm size. Firm size is measured by 
number of employees and the median is computed by country and 
industry. When we condition on size, it appears that the fraction of 
firms with disproportional ownership is higher among the larger firms. 
Overall 45 per cent of firms with size above the median have 
disproportional ownership structures compared to only 34 per cent for 
firms below the firm size median. However, across countries some 
variation occurs. For Belgium and Denmark small firms are more likely 
to have disproportional ownership structures. The use of mechanisms 
to separate control and income rights also varies across size. First, 
firms with dual class shares are more likely to be large and this 
pattern is consistent across countries. Firms with pyramidal ownership 
structures are also larger than the median with the exception of firms 
in Belgium and Denmark. 
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TABLE 3.2 SHARE OF FIRMS WITH DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURES CONDITIONAL ON FIRM SIZE 
 Disproprotional 
ownership 
Dual class shares Pyramids 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large
  
Austria 0.34 0.50 0.21 0.26 0.16 0.30
Belgium 0.34 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.21
Denmark 0.54 0.43 0.29 0.34 0.27 0.08
Finland 0.53 0.58 0.47 0.48 0.08 0.02
France 0.13 0.20 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.16
Germany 0.29 0.50 0.11 0.30 0.20 0.23
Ireland 0.35 0.46 0.22 0.31 0.16 0.21
Italy 0.44 0.66 0.28 0.57 0.20 0.26
Norway 0.33 0.59 0.03 0.21 0.31 0.41
Portugal 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.12
Spain 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.16
Sweden 0.75 0.73 0.60 0.62 0.26 0.27
UK 0.34 0.48 0.19 0.31 0.19 0.24
Note: Small firms are firms with number of employees below the median number of employees 
on industry and country level, whereas large firms have number of employees above the 
median. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
To examine whether innovative firms are more or less likely to have 
disproportional ownership we attempt to measure the level of 
innovation in a firm by the research and development (R&D) intensity 
on industry level. As discussed in Chapter 2, R&D intensity is drawn 
from OECD’s STAN database. The R&D variable measures the total 
expenditure firms use on R&D related investments by industry, year 
and country. R&D intensity is measured by dividing the actual R&D 
expenditure with gross value added by industry, year and country. 
Using this measure Finland, Sweden, France and Denmark are ranked 
as the most R&D intensive countries in the sample.  
 
Using the industry level of R&D intensity as a proxy for individual firm 
R&D intensity, TABLE 3.3 shows the R&D intensity across ownership 
structure and mechanism to separate control and income rights. The 
nth quartile divides the firms into two specific parts: Firms with values 
larger than the nth quartile and firms with values smaller than the nth 
quartile. The 1st quartile is the R&D intensity where 25 per cent of the 
firms have lower R&D intensity and 75 per cent have larger. Likewise 
for the 3rd quartile, 75 per cent of the firms have lower R&D intensity 
and 25 per cent have higher. 
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TABLE 3.3 R&D INTENSITY AND DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURES 
 quartiles of R&D intensity 
 1st 2nd 3rd 
Proportional 0.0017 0.0073 0.0265 
Disproportional 0.0020 0.0079 0.0577 
Dual class share 0.0015 0.0087 0.0578 
Pyramids 0.0021 0.0075 0.0623 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The 2nd quartile is the median. TABLE 3.3 shows that ownership 
structure does not appear to affect the R&D intensity of firms with low 
R&D: For all the listed categories of ownership structure, the 1st 
quartile of R&D intensity is more or less the same. For the median 
R&D intensity (2nd quartile) there are also very small differences. The 
median value of R&D intensity for a proportionally owned firm is 0.73 
per cent and this is 0.79 percent for a firm with disproportional 
ownership structure. However, at the 3rd quartile firms with 
disproportional ownership structure spend 5.77 per cent of gross 
value added on R&D and proportionally owned firms only spend 2.65 
per cent.  Hence, firms with disproportional ownership structures tend 
to have higher R&D intensity. For firms with dual class shares the 
comparable number is 5.78 per cent and for firms with pyramidal 
ownership it is 6.23 per cent. Finally, notice that the variation in R&D 
intensity is not across firms but across industry. Any within industry 
differences are not accounted for by these measures. 
 
3.2 Separation of control and income rights 
Since disproportional ownership separates control and income rights 
and therefore violates the principle of proportionality, it is of interest 
to analyse the degree of disproportional ownership. This section 
investigates the extent to which control is separated from income 
rights by focusing on the largest owner.  
 
The analysis of the difference between control and income rights 
starts by describing the distribution of control rights across Europe 
and continues to explore the extent to which control rights are 
separated from income rights conditional on having dual class shares 
and pyramidal ownership. 
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TABLE 3.4 LARGEST OWNER’S SHARE OF VOTES 
 Median votes 
  All 
Disproportional 
ownership 
Dual class  
shares Pyramids 
Austria 0.55 0.54 0.70 0.36 
Belgium 0.31 0.20 - 0.16 
Denmark 0.31 0.45 0.47 0.43 
Finland 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.26 
France 0.50 0.40 0.42 0.40 
Germany  0.50 0.38 0.45 0.30 
Ireland 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.14 
Italy 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.39 
Norway 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.29 
Portugal 0.46 0.41 - 0.41 
Spain 0.34 0.37 - 0.40 
Sweden 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.36 
UK 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 
All 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Note: Belgium. Spain and Portugal have missing values because of no DCS exist in the data. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
TABLE 3.4 provides evidence of median share of votes for the largest 
owner for each of the 13 countries in the sample. The largest owner’s 
median share of votes is reported for all firms, for firms with 
disproportional ownership, and for dual class shares and pyramids 
separately. For all countries, the largest owner has a median share of 
votes of 27 per cent. In other words, for half of the firms the largest 
owner possesses less than 27 per cent of the votes, whereas in the 
other half of the sample the largest owner’s share of votes is larger 
than 27 per cent. The cross-country variation is quite high with high 
concentration of control in Austria, Germany, France, Italy and 
Portugal. The largest owners in Ireland and United Kingdom possess 
less than 20 per cent of the votes, which reflects a low concentration 
of ownership. Firms with a disproportional ownership structure 
resemble the overall median (second column). This pattern seems to 
persist across dual class shares and pyramids. The conclusion is that 
concentration of control is quite high in some countries and low in 
other countries, whether firms are disproportionally or proportionally 
owned matters slightly less in this comparison.  
 
In TABLE 3.5, the (absolute) degree of disproportional ownership, 
which is measured by the difference between the largest owner’s 
share of votes and income rights, is shown for firms with 
disproportional ownership structures. Italy, Portugal, Denmark and 
Norway show the largest degree of disproportional ownership.  
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TABLE 3.5 LARGEST OWNER’S DEGREE OF DISPROPORTIONALITY  
 Median Absolute Disproportional ownership 
  All Dual class shares Pyramids 
Austria 0.13 0.14 0.15 
Belgium 0.11 - 0.10 
Denmark 0.16 0.24 - 
Finland 0.08 0.07 0.17 
France 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Germany  0.13 0.15 0.12 
Ireland 0.07 0.04 0.11 
Italy 0.17 0.15 0.24 
Norway 0.16 0.06 0.18 
Portugal 0.17 - 0.17 
Spain 0.13 - 0.14 
Sweden 0.13 0.17 0.10 
UK 0.02 0.02 0.03 
All 0.07 0.06 0.09 
Note: Degree of disproprotionality is defined as share of votes minus share of income rights. 
Missing values are indicated by -. For Denmark the data do not allow calculation of 
absolute disproportional ownership for all firms with pyramidal ownership structures. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
United Kingdom, France and Ireland have the lowest. As the concen-
tration of votes was very low in UK and Ireland the degree of dispro-
portional ownership is expectedly low. There is a slight tendency to-
wards pyramidal structures having larger degree of disproportional 
ownership with the exception of Denmark and Sweden. Again country-
specific restrictions on dual class shares can explain some of the 
variation across countries in the degree of disproportional ownership. 
 
Finally TABLE 3.6 shows the share of firms with a single large owner. 
Large owners are defined as any owner possessing more than 10 per 
cent of the votes. Thus, TABLE 3.6 shows the fractions of firms where 
the largest owner is the only large shareholder. TABLE 3.6 shows that 
in Austria, Belgium, Portugal, France and Sweden the largest owner is 
likely to be the only large shareholder. In Finland, Norway and 
Denmark at least one other large shareholder is present in 50 per 
cent of the firms. Differences between firms with disproportional and 
proportional ownership structure are very small. But a distinct pattern 
between firms with dual class share and firms with pyramidal 
ownership is that for pyramidal ownership structures more than half 
of the firms have more than one large owner compared to only around 
one-third for firms with dual class shares. 
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TABLE 3.6 SHARE OF FIRMS WITH A SINGLE LARGE OWNER 
Country All DP DCS PYR 
Austria 0.83 0.68 0.77 0.65 
Belgium 0.70 0.71 - 0.77 
Denmark 0.50 0.54 0.59 0.33 
Finland 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.35 
France 0.65 0.64 1.00 0.59 
Germany 0.59 0.49 0.63 0.37 
Ireland 0.63 0.79 0.87 0.72 
Italy 0.58 0.51 0.52 0.43 
Norway 0.45 0.25 0.36 0.21 
Portugal 0.67 0.74 - 0.74 
Spain 0.55 0.44 - 0.44 
Sweden 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.48 
UK 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.45 
All 0.58 0.52 0.58 0.45 
Note: DP is disproportionality, DCS is dual class shares, PYR is pyramids. 
Source: Own calculation 
 
In summary, the evidence in this section points at a complex 
connection between the degree of disproportional ownership and 
mechanisms to separate control and income rights. In general firms 
with pyramidal structures have a slightly larger degree of 
disproportional ownership, and are also more likely to be controlled by 
more than a single large owner than firms with dual class shares.  
 
3.3 Other mechanisms to separate control 
from income rights 
The two most common disproportionality mechanisms are dual class 
shares and pyramidal ownership. However, other mechanisms exist 
that can effectively separate control and income rights. These include 
e.g. golden shares, voting caps, and cross ownership. Golden shares 
are shares which are able to outvote all other shares in certain 
specified events and are often held by the government. Voting caps 
limit the voting rights of shareholders above a certain level. Cross 
ownership is when a firm, X, controls another firm, Y, which in turn 
controls part of X. The sample does not allow distinguishing between 
these other mechanisms except for cross-holdings. 
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TABLE 3.7 OTHER MECHANISMS TO SEPARATE CONTROL AND INCOME 
RIGHTS 
 Other Mechanisms 
  N Share 
Austria 1 0.01 
Belgium 5 0.06 
Denmark 8 0.05 
Finland 7 0.07 
France 0 0.00 
Germany 20 0.04 
Ireland 1 0.02 
Italy 2 0.01 
Norway 4 0.03 
Portugal 0 0.00 
Spain 3 0.02 
Sweden 1 0.01 
UK 11 0.01 
All 63 0.02 
Source: Own calculation. 
 
TABLE 3.7 shows that few European firms have implemented other 
mechanisms than dual class shares and pyramids to separate control 
and income rights. The share of all firms with other mechanisms is 2 
per cent. Across the countries the highest share is found in Finland, 
Denmark and Belgium. For Finland, Denmark and Belgium none of the 
firms are cross holdings, whereas in Austria, Germany, and Norway 
close to all of them are cross holdings.  
 
The residual category is not of central concern in this report as the 
group is quite small. Thus, other disproportionality mechanisms will 
not be given much attention in the analysis in the following chapter 
focusing on the effect on firm performance. 
 
3.4 Ownership structures in Scandinavia 
The following is a summary of the main characteristics of 
disproportional ownership structures with a focus on Scandinavia. The 
comparison of main characteristics is accomplished by dividing the 13 
countries into four origins of company law (La Porta et al. (1998)). 
The four regions are: Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden), common law (United Kingdom and Ireland), German legal 
origin (Germany and Austria) and French legal origin (France, 
Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Portugal). The starting point for this 
classification of legal regimes is the recognition that laws in different 
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countries are typically not written from scratch, but rather 
transplanted from a few legal families or traditions. There exist two 
broad legal traditions; the common law which is English in origin and 
the civil law which derives from Roman law. Within the civil law 
tradition three major families exist; French, German and 
Scandinavian. Moreover, as the legal environment and local traditions 
shape ownership structures the legal classification provides a 
framework to compare differences across regions.  
 
FIGURE 3.1 LARGEST OWNER’S 
SHARE OF CASH FLOW AND VOTES, 
SCANDINAVIA 
FIGURE 3.2 LARGEST OWNER’S 
SHARE OF CASH FLOW AND VOTES, 
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Source: Own calculation. Source: Own calculation. 
 
FIGURE 3.3 LARGEST OWNER’S 
SHARE OF CASH FLOW AND VOTES, 
GERMAN LEGAL ORIGIN 
FIGURE 3.4 LARGEST OWNER’S 
SHARE OF CASH FLOW AND VOTES, 
FRENCH LEGAL ORIGIN 
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FIGURE 3.1 to FIGURE 3.4 show a plot of the largest owner’s votes and 
income rights for each of the legal regions. The 45-degree lines in 
FIGURE 3.1 to FIGURE 3.4 contain all firms with a proportional ownership 
structure. Comparing Scandinavia with the other regions show that 
Common Law countries have the smallest concentration of ownership 
followed by Scandinavia. This is clearly supported by TABLE 3.4 where 
UK and Ireland have the smallest concentration, whereas Austria and 
Germany have the highest. Thus, firms in Scandinavia on average 
have a lower ownership concentration than firms in Continental 
Europe, but a more concentrated ownership structure than firms in 
the UK and Ireland. 
 
FIGURE 3.1 to FIGURE 3.4 also allow for a comparison of the degree of 
disproportionality for firms with disproportional ownership across the 
legal regions. The off-diagonal points in the diagrams are firms with a 
disproportional ownership structure. The degree of absolute 
disproportionalilty is the vertical distance between a point and the 45-
degree line (see in TABLE 3.5 for a detailed cross-country comparison 
of the median degree of disproportionality).9 Scandinavian firms with 
disproportional ownership have on average a significant wedge 
between the concentration of control and income rights. Among the 
firms with disproportional ownership, firms in Scandinavia show a 
pattern similar to the French and German legal origin. This is slightly 
surprising as the concentration of ownership in general is larger in the 
latter regions, which can be seen from TABLE 3.4. However, this effect 
is opposed by a higher concentration of votes for firms with 
disproportional ownership structures in Scandinavia (again see TABLE 
3.4 for Denmark and Sweden).  
 
The prior analysis showed large differences in the use of dual class 
shares across countries. To shed further light on these differences 
FIGURE 3.5 shows a plot of the share of firms with dual class shares 
against the share of firms with pyramidal ownership structures for the 
four legal regimes. 
 
                                          
 
 
9 Notice that Scandinavia is the only legal region with firms with a negative degree of absolute 
disproportional ownership structures. The explanation is that for these firms the proportion of 
superior voting shares of total shares is very small and the largest owner is found among owners 
with limited voting shares. 
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FIGURE 3.5 MECHANISMS TO SEPARATE CASH FLOW AND VOTES 
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Source: Own calculation. 
 
From FIGURE 3.5 it is evident that Scandinavia is characterized by 
many firms with dual class shares. In both Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden there is a high fraction of publicly traded firms that have dual 
class shares. FIGURE 3.5 also shows that use of pyramidal ownership is 
quite constant across the four legal regions.  
 
In summary, this implies that dual class shares is a very important 
characteristic of ownership structures in Scandinavia. Scandinavian 
firms simply use dual class shares more frequently than firms in other 
European countries. Moreover, firms with dual class shares in 
Scandinavia have a significant wedge between the concentration of 
control and income rights. This implies that dual class shares are used 
differently in Scandinavia than in e.g. the UK, where many firms have 
dual class shares, but few have a significant separation of control and 
income rights. Thus, the analysis shows that if firms in Scandinavia 
are forced to unify their share classes it would have a significant effect 
on ownership structures, since the controlling owners would be forced 
to reduce their control stakes – unless they possess capital to buy up 
larger stakes in the firms. 
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3.5 Motives for using disproportional 
mechanisms 
The large dispersion across countries in the use of dual class shares 
makes it important to consider the reasons that firms separate control 
and income rights by implementing disproportional mechanisms. 
 
There are many reasons for a firm to end up with disproportional 
ownership structures. Some firms have a disproportional ownership 
structure because the owners find that it is the best organizational 
form that can help the firm and the owners realize future goals and 
visions. Other firms end up with disproportional ownership structures 
due to changes in the numbers and identities of owners of the firm, 
e.g. through privatization, mergers or acquisitions. 
 
Dual class shares are typically implemented because the founder of 
the firm has a strategy of how control with the company could be 
preserved in the future. Thus, dual class shares are frequently used as 
a remedy to preserve control within the family in succession decisions 
or to preserve control in the hand of the founders after an initial 
public offering. The first argument provides a historical reason why 
Scandinavian firms today have dual class shares, whereas the second 
argument is a reason for why a number of firms outside Scandinavia 
today go public with dual class shares - even in countries like the US 
and UK. Dual class shares also serves as a strong protection of the 
current ownership structure in Scandinavian and parts of Continental 
Europe. If these firms abandon dual class shares, many firms would 
be vulnerable against uninvited takeovers from other companies or 
buyout funds. Thus, an important reason to keep a disproportional 
ownership structure is to protect the companies and controlling 
owners against uninvited takeovers. 
 
Pyramidal ownership structures typically arise as a consequence of 
merger and acquisition activity. Ownership structures most likely 
change as a result of corporate transactions and therefore merger and 
acquisition transactions are the main source that creates pyramidal 
ownership structures. 
 
Golden shares are rare in European firms, but typically observed in 
former state owned companies in e.g. France, where the government 
has kept a controlling stake after privatization. 
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Voting caps are rare and mainly found in the financial sector. These 
are typically implemented as a mechanism to preserve control in the 
hand of the managers of the firms. 
 
Finally, cross-ownership is often used in companies that have a 
common history. This can either be because they are spin-offs from 
the same original company or they have a common bank or financial 
institution as controlling owners. The latter is the primary reason for 
cross-ownership being used in Germany. 
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter showed that ownership structures vary significantly 
across European countries. In general ownership is highly 
concentrated in Continental Europe and relatively dispersed in the UK 
and Ireland. Disproportional ownership structures are common in all 
European countries, although there are significant differences in how 
they are used. The use of dual class shares vary across countries, 
whereas the use of pyramidal ownership structures is fairly constant. 
The use of dual class shares is dominated by firms in Scandinavia. 
Scandinavian firms with dual class shares have a significant wedge 
between the concentration of control and income rights. 
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4 Disproportional ownership 
structures, value, performance 
and growth 
 
Firms’ economic situation is of concern for society at large. Countries 
and regions with well performing firms have a larger income base and 
more employment. Hence, firms’ economic situation is decisive for the 
standard of living of the surrounding community. This chapter 
analyzes the interplay between firms’ economic situation and their 
ownership structures. 
 
4.1 Relevant aspects of firms’ economic 
situation 
Firms’ economic situation and their growth prospects are important to 
current and potential owners, to employees and to society in general. 
However, the different stakeholders care about different aspects of 
firms’ economic situation. For example, the current owners have a 
great interest in the ability of the firm to generate a pecuniary 
surplus, while the employees have a great interest in keeping their 
jobs and receiving a satisfactory level of wages. Society is interested 
in achieving a high standard of living for both firms’ owners and 
employees, and typically society has an interest in raising tax revenue 
and maintaining a high level of employment.  
 
To facilitate the European discussion on the pros and cons of 
disproportional ownership, it is necessary to consider a comprehen-
sive set of economic effects of disproportional ownership. We consider 
firms’ value as an indicator of expected future income streams, which 
are relevant to both owners and society as a whole. We consider 
firms’ return on assets, the growth of firm value and of share prices 
as indicators of operating performance, which is of direct interest to 
owners and society as a whole. We also consider sales growth as an 
indication of the economic outlook of firms. Finally, we consider 
growth of employment as an indicator of the employment outlook, 
which is directly relevant for the employees. 
 
From a policy perspective the ideal measures of growth in either sales 
or employment are organic growth. This excludes growth from e.g. 
takeovers, mergers and acquisitions (M&A). However, with the 
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present data it is impossible to distinguish between organic and 
acquisition growth. Therefore care must be taken in interpreting the 
results of disproportional ownership on growth in employment and 
sales. In particular, if the ability to issue equity to finance takeovers 
differs across ownership structures it will impact the ability to grow 
through acquisitions. It is therefore impossible to disentangle whether 
it is the lack of ability to finance acquisitions or the lack of organic 
growth that caused low growth rates for certain firms. 
 
The following analysis provides an in depth assessment of the effect 
of disproportional ownership on the indicators mentioned. First, focus 
is on the effect on each of the indicators in general. Second, the 
analysis extends to separate effect of dual class shares and pyramidal 
ownership. Third, the effect of R&D activity will be included in a 
separate analysis. Protection of long run investment, like research and 
development, can be an argument for disproportional ownership, 
which might sacrifice other short term considerations. Fourth, the 
effect of disproportionality on performance is accessed for a smaller 
group of high tech firms. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics of the economic 
indicators 
In TABLE 4.1 to TABLE 4.4 mean and median of each of the indicators of 
firms’ economic situation are reported across ownership structures 
together with standard errors and number of firm-year observations. 
All tables report results from the unbalanced dataset.  
 
TABLE 4.1 DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO 
Ownership structure Mean Median Standard Error N 
Proportional 1.2282 0.8384 0.0311 16,320
Disproportional 1.0711 0.8375 0.0108 10,813
Dual Class Share 0.9890 0.8174 0.0114 6,295
Pyramid 1.1165 0.8451 0.0165 5,534
Other Mechanisms 1.1654 0.7875 0.0746 450
Note: Yearly measures of market-to-book ratio. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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The mean market to book ratio is highest for firms with proportional 
ownership and firms with other disproportional mechanisms in TABLE 
4.1. Dual class share firms have the lowest market to book ratio. 
These results are partly confirmed by the analyses based on the 
median values. The median market to book ratio is clearly smaller 
than the mean value. This can be explained by some very large 
market to book ratios in the sample.10 The overall differences across 
proportionally and disproportionally owned firms disappear for the 
median firm. The median values show less dispersion across dispro-
portional ownership and mechanisms. However, measured by the 
mean values, firms with pyramidal ownership structure have slightly 
higher market-to-book ration than firms which have proportional 
ownership structure, and much higher market-to-book ration than 
firms which use dual class shares or other mechanisms. 
  
Turning to return on assets in TABLE 4.2, disproportionally owned firms 
on average have slightly higher return on assets than the proportion-
nally owned firms. However, the difference is not statistically signify-
cant. This result is mainly driven by pyramidal ownership structures, 
which have a higher return on assets than any other ownership struc-
ture. The low values of firms with other mechanisms hardly influence 
the results for disproportionally owned firms, because of the few firms 
using these mechanisms (see Chapter 3 for details). These results are 
confirmed by median values. As it is the case for market-to-book 
ratios, the median values shows less dispersion than the mean values. 
Firms with dual class shares and pyramidal ownership are performing 
relatively similar in terms of the median operating performance.  
 
TABLE 4.2 DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
(RETURN ON ASSETS) 
Ownership structure Mean Median Standard Error N 
Proportional 0.0352 0.0433 0.0016 16,243 
Disproportional 0.0422 0.0453 0.0013 10,853 
Dual Class Share 0.0390 0.0440 0.0014 6,336 
Pyramid 0.0440 0.0465 0.0021 5,541 
Other Mechanisms 0.0382 0.0375 0.0041 462 
Note: Yearly return on assets. 
Source: Own calculations. 
                                          
 
 
10 The median is not influenced by very large or small values. Remember it is the value for the firm 
where 50 percent of observations have a larger value and 50 percent has a lower value. 
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TABLE 4.3 DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND THE ABILITY TO GROWTH 
(SALES GROWTH) 
Ownership structure Mean Median Standard Error N 
Proportional 0.0599 0.0579 0.0040 14,617
Disproportional 0.0541 0.0483 0.0045 9,635
Dual Class Share 0.0500 0.0476 0.0051 5,641
Pyramid 0.0564 0.0475 0.0070 4,900
Other Mechanisms 0.0382 0.0212 0.0199 407
Note: Growth rates are approximated by differences in the logarithm to sales. One-year 
growth rates. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The results of sales growth are given in TABLE 4.3. Proportionally ow-
ned firms have slightly higher sales growth than disproportionally 
owned firms. However, the standard errors show that the differrence 
in mean growth is insignificant. Considering the mechanism to 
separate control and income rights, pyramids generate the highest 
sales growth, although the effect is insignificant. The difference be-
tween proportional and disproportional ownership structures is slightly 
more profound for median values. Expanding sales can be achieved by 
expansions of existing production units or by M&A activity. Thus, 
some care must be exercised with the results stated in Section 4.1.   
 
With respect to employment growth, proportionally owned firms have 
slightly higher employment growth, both when measured by mean 
and median growth, compared to disproportionally owned firms, as 
can be seen in TABLE 4.4. Within the disproportionally owned firms the 
mean effect is driven by a low growth rate of firms with dual class 
shares. The median value for dual class share, however, shows that 
the median firm with dual class shares is not significantly different 
from pyramids in terms of employment growth. An interesting pattern 
of each mechanisms’ effect on growth emerge from TABLE 4.3 and 
TABLE 4.4, where the median growth rate for each mechanism is less 
than the median for the combined group of firms with disproportional 
ownership structures. The reason is that some firms combine 
mechanisms, e.g. dual class shares and pyramidal ownership 
structures, and these firms have very low growth rates. 
 
The final performance measure, growth in market value, in TABLE 4.5 
reveals that the firms in the sample on average decreased in market 
value. However, disproportionally owned firms did so to a lesser 
extent than proportionally owned firms. Within disproportionally 
owned firms some variation exists. Dual class shares experienced the 
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best performance followed by pyramids and other mechanisms. The 
latter had mean and median growth very much like proportionally 
owned firms. It is interesting to note the difference between the 
results in TABLE 4.1 on the level of market value and the result on the 
growth rate. First, the dynamics of firm value seem to be an 
important aspect of the story. Second, growing and downsizing firms 
might not perform identically conditional on ownership structure.  
 
Overall the pattern of ownership structures and performance are 
identical to Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006). Firms with proportional 
ownership structures have a higher market to book ratio on average, 
though the results are less clear for the median firm. No differences 
appear on return on assets across ownership structures. The ability to 
grow is in favour of proportionally owned firms, although this might 
be caused by the ability to grow through M&A activity if firms with 
disproportional ownership structures are restricted in their ability to 
finance growth through acquisitions. In addition, it should be noted 
that the above differences in the partial analysis might be driven by 
differences in firm characteristics. The following section analyzes the 
differences in performance in a regression framework that include 
controls for differences in firm characteristics. 
 
TABLE 4.4 DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND THE ABILITY TO GROWTH 
(EMPLOYMENT GROWTH) 
Ownership structure Mean Median Standard Error N 
Proportional 0.0324 0.0120 0.0039 13,112 
Disproportional 0.0243 0.0097 0.0049 8,567 
Dual Class Share 0.0186 0.0082 0.0066 5,039 
Pyramid 0.0302 0.0089 0.0071 4,376 
Other Mechanisms 0.0184 0.0 0.0122 343 
Note: Growth rates are approximated by differences in the logarithm to employment. One-
year growth rates. 
SOURCE: OWN CALCULATIONS. 
 
TABLE 4.5 DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND THE ABILITY TO GROWTH, 
(MARKET TO BOOK RATIO GROWTH) 
Ownership structure Mean Median Standard Error N 
Proportional -0.0132 -0.0036 0.0032 14,075 
Disproportional -0.0083 0.0011 0.0034 9,359 
Dual Class Share -0.0039 0.0018 0.0042 5,494 
Pyramid -0.0125 0.0004 0.0049 4,753 
Other Mechanisms -0.0131 -0.0075 0.0148 386 
Note: Growth rates are approximated by differences in the logarithm to market to book ratio. 
One-year growth rates. 
Source: Own calculations 
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4.3 Effects of ownership structures 
The differences in the value, performance and growth indicators 
across ownership structures might be driven by other variables than 
ownership structure per se. For example, in Chapter 3 larger firms 
were more likely to have a disproportional ownership structure. But 
larger firms might also have a lower market-to-book ratio. To control 
for firm characteristics that might affect firms’ economic situation the 
effect of ownership is investigated in an empirical model.  
 
The control variables included are standard from the related literature 
(Sutton (1997), Claessens et al. (2002), and Bennedsen and Nielsen 
(2006)). First, firm size is in general a very important predictor of 
firms’ economic situation whether it is market value, growth rates in 
sales or employment or return on assets. In the empirical model, log 
sales and squared log sales approximate firm size. Second, leverage, 
which is the debt-to-asset ratio, is included to reflect the capital 
structure of the firm. Third, country effects are included to capture 
institutional differences across countries. Fourth, income rights of the 
largest owner control for the largest owners’ incentives. Fifth, industry 
dummies pick up various industry specific effects. Sixth, year 
dummies reflect differences in business cycle effects across time. 
Finally, R&D intensity is introduced in a separate analysis to account 
for differences in the level of research and development within 
industry and country. As discussed in Chapter 2, the report includes 
OECD’s R&D measures on an industry basis (ANBERD).  
 
Instead of estimation of the five equations separately, estimation 
proceeds with joint estimation of them. Joint estimation restricts 
analysis to complete cases for the dependent variables with a small 
loss in the number of observations. However, joint estimation 
improves the efficiency, since we allow for correlation of error terms 
across equations. 
 
4.4 Results 
TABLE 4.6 shows the result for the five performance measures after 
controlling for observable differences in firm characteristics. For firms’ 
market value, the effect of disproportional ownership is negative and 
significant, which is consistent with the literature (see Bennedsen and 
Nielsen, 2006 and references herein).  
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TABLE 4.6 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP ON 
PERFORMANCE 
  MB RoA SG EG MBG 
DP -0.091 0.003 -0.026 -0.023 0.010 
 (4.73) (1.12) (3.79) (3.41) (1.76) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1091 0.0647 0.0543 0.0186 0.0496 
No of obs. 18,277 18,277 18,277 18,277 18,277 
Note: MB is market to book ratio, RoA is return on assets, SG is sales growth, and EG is 
employment growth as dependent variable. MBG is growth in market to book ratio. DP is 
disproportionality, T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Using the mean market to book ratio for proportionally owned firms, 
the interpretation of the coefficient of -0.091 is that disproportionally 
owned firms have on average 8.2 per cent lower market to book ratio 
compared to proportionally owned firms (ceteris paribus). This 
estimate is smaller than e.g. Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006). The 
main expla-nations are a slightly different sample, and a longer period 
of analysis. Moving to return on assets in column 2 of TABLE 4.6 the 
difference between proportional and disproportional ownership 
disappears. The effect of disproportional ownership is positive but 
insignificant. Thus, firms with disproportional ownership structures 
have a similar operating performance to firms with a proportional 
ownership structure. 
 
Column 3 and 4 in TABLE 4.6 show the impact of disproportional ow-
nership structures on firm growth. Column 3 shows that firms with a 
disproportional ownership structure have a 2.3 percentage point lower 
employment growth per year. This difference is significant at the one 
per cent level. Consistently, Column 4 shows that firms with a dispro-
portional ownership structure have a 2.4 percentage point lower sales 
growth compared to proportionally owned firms. Thus, both our 
specifications of firm growth show that firms with disproportional 
ownership structures have low growth compared to firms with 
proportional ownership. As discussed in the introduction of the 
chapter, this difference in growth rates might be driven by growth 
through acquisitions rather than organic growth. In particular, this is 
likely to be the case if firms with disproportional ownership structures 
are restricted in their ability to obtain external financing e.g. through 
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share issues. This is likely to be the case for the group of firms that 
have introduced disproportional mechanisms to preserve control in 
the hands of the controlling owners and/or founders of the firm (c.f. 
Chapter 3.5). Finally, it should be noted that the results in TABLE 4.6 
are consistent with previous literature (see e.g. Bennedsen and 
Nielsen (2006)). 
 
The final column shows the results of disproportional ownership 
structure on growth in market value. Here disproportional ownership 
structures grow at a one per cent higher rate on average from 1996 
to 2004 ceteris paribus. The estimated effect of disproportional 
ownership structure is significant only at the ten per cent level. The 
difference in level and growth of market to book ratio is puzzling and 
reveals that it is important to account for dynamics changes in 
ownership structure. Since the report rely on time invariant ownership 
variables it is impossible to establish a dynamic link.11 
  
TABLE 4.7 sheds light on the effect of R&D intensity and disproportion-
nal ownership, when we introduce the R&D intensity in the statistical 
framework used above. The analysis in Chapter 3 showed that firms 
with disproportional ownership structures were associated with a high 
R&D intensity. The analysis is restricted to the manufacturing sector 
where measurement problems related to R&D are less severe.  
 
For firms in industries without R&D the effect of disproportional 
ownership structures is given by the first row in TABLE 4.7. The 
numbers cannot be directly compared with TABLE 4.6, which focused 
on all industries. If we restrict the sample to manufacturing industries 
we generally find a small significant effect of disproportionality on firm 
value and no significant effect on operating performance, whereas 
firms with disproportional ownership structures have significantly 
lower growth.12 Thus, these results are similar to the effect for firms 
in industries without R&D with the exception of the significantly lower 
effect of disproportionality on operating performance.  
                                          
 
 
11 An alternative measure of growth in value is growth in share prices. Here the estimated effect of 
disproportionality is zero. This underlines the complexity of the problem. Not only is dynamics a 
serious specification issue but the mere definition of value is also important. 
12 The effect of disproportional ownership for manufacturing without R&D intensity (cf. Table 1.5) is  
-0.085, -0.005, -0.039 and -0.032 for market to book ratio, return on assets, sales growth, and 
employment growth, respectively.  
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TABLE 4.7 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP ON 
PERFORMANCE INCL. R&D (MANUFACTURING SECTOR) 
  MB RoA SG EG MBG 
DP -0.039 -0.019 -0.032 -0.037 0.004 
 (0.99) (4.81) (2.99) (3.59) (0.33) 
R&D 1.322 -0.134 0.163 0.017 -0.082 
 (4.91) (4.86) (2.23) (0.24) (1.02) 
DP*R&D -0.833 0.199 -0.078 0.073 0.043 
 (2.18) (5.06) (0.75) (0.72) (0.38) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1283 0.1589 0.0871 0.0372 0.0524 
No of obs. 7,341 7,341 7,341 7,341 7,341 
Note: See note to TABLE 4.6. R&D is research and development intensity. DP*R&D is the 
interaction of disproportionality and R&D. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Firms in industries with high R&D intensity generally have significantly 
higher firm value, lower operating performance and higher sales 
growth. This is not surprising, as the positive effect on firm value 
reflects the value of growth options, the negative effect on operating 
performance is most likely driven by current expenses to R&D, 
whereas the positive effect on sales growth might be driven by 
successful companies’ introduction of new innovations on the market. 
 
There is an interesting interaction effect between R&D intensity and 
disproportional ownership, as shown in the third row in TABLE 4.7 This 
effect results in a significantly lower market to book ratio. However, it 
is worth noticing that the joint effect of R&D intensity is a positive 
effect on firm performance (0.489 = 1.322-0.833). Thus, firms with 
disproportional ownership structures in R&D intensive industries have 
higher firm value than firms outside R&D intensive industries, but 
significantly lower firm value compared to proportionally owned firms 
in R&D intensive industries. 
 
For disproportionally owned firms the effect of R&D on return on 
assets is positive (0.065=0.199-0.134). Thus, R&D intensive firms 
with disproportional ownership structures have better operating 
performance than R&D intensive firms with proportional ownership 
structures. Again, the results should be interpreted with care, as we 
measure R&D intensity on industry level rather than on the firm level.  
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For growth in either employment, sales or firm value the impact of 
R&D is not significantly different for disproportionally owned firms 
compared to proportionally owned firms. Although the effect on 
employment growth is positive the effect is grossly insignificant. 
 
To further shed light on the effect of the actual mechanisms to 
separate ownership and control on performance, TABLE 4.8 reports the 
effect of each mechanism on the five performance measures. The 
sample again includes all industries. The results from TABLE 4.8 points 
in one direction. The analyses reported in TABLE 4.8 thus suggest that 
all the results reported earlier in TABLE 4.6 are driven by firms with 
dual class shares. The other mechanisms are not statistically 
significant from firms with proportional ownership.  
 
Firms with dual class shares have significantly lower firm value and 
lower growth measured by both sales and employees, but higher 
growth in market value. An important caveat to the interpretation of 
these results is that our ownership information is static, which means 
that firms which have abandoned dual class shares are categorized as 
having dual class shares. Thus we cannot distinguish whether the 
higher growth in market value is driven by unifications or better eco-
nomic performance. The effect on operating performance is insignifi-
cant. The results for pyramids and other mechanisms are insignificant. 
Thus, the results in TABLE 4.6 are driven by firms with dual class 
shares.  
 
TABLE 4.8 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MECHANISM TO SEPARATE CASH FLOW 
AND VOTES ON PERFORMANCE 
  MB RoA SG EG MBG 
DCS -0.198 0.000 -0.037 -0.032 0.015
 (8.81) (0.01) (4.71) (4.07) (2.23) 
PYR -0.015 0.002 -0.008 -0.009 0.003
 (0.70) (0.62) (1.00) (1.09) (0.41) 
ODP 0.122 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007
 (1.71) (0.97) (0.39) (0.30) (0.34) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1121 0.0647 0.0547 0.0189 0.0497
No of obs. 18,277 18,277 18,277 18,277 18,277
Note: DCS is dual class shares, PYR is pyramids, ODP is other disproportionality. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Until now the effect of disproportional ownership has been assessed 
on the mean.13 The analysis in section 4.2 showed that the mean and 
median performance measure did not always agree. TABLE 4.9 con-
tains the estimates of the effect of disproportional ownership on per-
formance on each of the four performance measures for each of the 
three mechanisms in a model for the median firm. The main result is 
that the mean regression results are confirmed by the median regres-
sions when we include firm characteristics as controls. The exception 
is return on assets, which reveals a negative effect of firms with dual 
class shares and a positive effect of firms with pyramidal ownership. 
 
The final evidence of disproportional ownership structure and 
performance is accessed for firms which operate in high tech 
industries as classified by the OECD.14 
 
TABLE 4.9 MEDIAN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MECHANIMS TO SEPARATE 
CASH FLOW AND VOTES ON PERFORMANCE 
  MB RoA SG EG MBG 
DCS -0.078 -0.004 -0.023 -0.011 0.009 
 (9.15) (5.16) (10.12) (5.88) (2.42) 
PYR 0.014 -0.001 -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 
 (1.75) (0.84) (2.74) (3.64) (0.51) 
ODP -0.018 0 -0.016 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.66) (0.05) (1.53) (0.58) (0.13 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.0565 0.0442 0.0685 0.0128 0.0283 
No of obs. 21,209 21,209 21,209 21,209 21,209 
Note: See note to TABLE 4.8 
Source: Own calculations 
 
                                          
 
 
13 From a policy perspective the mean is of course of central importance, as it often describes the 
centre of the distribution of firms. However, policy makers might also be interested in other 
segments (non-central) of the data. This will not be taken up here, but instead another central 
measure will be used, the median, which is more robust towards extreme values in the dependent 
variable. Moreover, some of the statistical defiance’s mentioned by Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006) 
can perhaps be dealt with. 
14 The definition of high tech firms follows OECD and includes manufacture of pharmaceuticals, 
medical chemicals and botanical products (ISIC 2423), manufacture of office, accounting and 
computing machinery  (ISIC 30), manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus (ISIC 32), manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks (ISIC 33), and manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft (ISIC 353). 
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TABLE 4.10 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE ON PERFORMANCE, HIGH TECH INDUSTRIES 
  MB RoA SG EG MBG 
DP 0.105 0.006 -0.087 -0.035 0.014
 (0.81) (0.54) (3.06) (1.84) (0.48) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1671 0.2568 0.0680 0.0774 0.1159
No of obs. 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149
Note: See note to TABLE 4.6. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The results in TABLE 4.10 indicate that the earlier results on the effects 
of disproportional ownership on firms’ value, operating performance 
and growth are to a large extent driven by low technology firms. For 
high technology firms, disproportional ownership has no significant 
effect on the market-to-book ratio, and the effects on employment 
growth and growth in the market-to-book ratio are insignificant. 
 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has analyzed the connection between ownership 
structures and firm performance. The main findings are two: First, 
firms with disproportional ownership structures on average have a 
lower firm value than firms with a proportional ownership structure. 
However, the disproportional ownership structure is also associated 
with a larger growth in firm value. This indicates a dynamic analysis of 
firm value is relevant. Second, there is on average no significant 
difference in operating performance between the two groups.  
 
The chapter also showed that the negative value effect and positive 
growth in value are driven by firms with dual class shares, although 
firms with dual class shares have the same operating performance as 
other firms. 
  
R&D and market value is positively related for firms with 
disproportional ownership structure: Market value rises with R&D 
intensity. However, this effect is smaller for firms with a proportional 
ownership structure. Ownership structure has little or no influence on 
return on assets. The exception is firms with disproportional 
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ownership structure and high R&D intensity, which shows good 
performance in terms of return on assets. 
 
The chapter also analysed the effect of ownership on sales and 
employment growth. The effect of disproportional ownership 
structures was negative; but the result is very likely to be sensitive to 
the definition of sales and employment growth. This report uses a 
measure, which includes organic as well as growth that origins from 
merger and acquisitions. If the ability to issue equity to finance 
takeovers differs across ownership structures, this result might be 
influenced by the definition of growth.  
 
Finally, this chapter has analyzed the effect of disproportional 
ownership on firms’ value, operating performance and growth for a 
set of high technology firms. For this group of firms the only 
significant effect of disproportional ownership is a negative effect on 
firms’ sales growth. 
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5 Results for the pharmaceutical 
industry 
 
In the performance analysis in Chapter 4 industry effects were 
included to account for differences in research and development 
intensity across industries. In this section focus will be on the 
pharmaceutical industry relative to all other industries. The 
pharmaceutical industry is interesting for at least three reasons: First, 
the industry is one of the most important sectors in Scandinavia as 
well as in the rest of Europe. Second, the industry is characterised by 
having a high research and development intensity. Third, the industry 
has witnessed significant growth rates over the last decades.  
 
The objective of this analysis is twofold: First, are the ownership 
structures of pharmaceutical firms different from non-pharmaceutical 
firms? Second, is the effect of disproportional ownership structures on 
firm performance and outcomes different for pharmaceutical firms?15 
 
5.1 Industry distribution of disproportional 
ownership structures 
The industry grouping in Chapter 4 followed Bennedsen and Nielsen 
(2006). Industry grouping from Worldscope is by SIC codes. Industry 
affiliation is defined by where the largest sale occurs in firms that 
operate in multiple industries. Therefore it is likely that firms have 
activities in other areas, although the industry classification captures 
the primary industry affiliation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
15 A disclaimer to the result in this chapter compared to the previous chapters is the small sample 
size. Thus, care must be exercised in interpreting the results.  
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TABLE 5.1 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR 
COMPARED WITH OTHER INDUSTRIES 
 
French legal 
origin 
German legal 
origin  Scandinavia 
Common 
law All 
  N Share N Share N Share N 
Sha
-re N Mean 
Pharma           
   DP 9 0.50 3 0.60 14 0.74 13 0.35 39 0.49 
   DCS 3 0.17 2 0.40 11 0.58 5 0.14 21 0.27 
   PYR  7 0.39 1 0.20 4 0.21 9 0.24 21 0.27 
   ODP 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.05 0 0.00 1 0.01 
Non-
pharma           
   DP 212 0.24 246 0.39 286 0.55 631 0.42 1375 0.39 
   DCS 70 0.08 117 0.19 188 0.36 184 0.26 559 0.22 
   PYR  152 0.17 148 0.24 122 0.23 318 0.21 740 0.21 
   ODP 10 0.01 21 0.03 19 0.04 12 0.01 62 0.02 
Note: French legal region is Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. German legal origin is 
Germany and Austria, Scandinavia is Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Common law is 
Ireland and United Kingdom, DP is disproportional ownership, DCS is dual class shares, 
PYR is pyramids, and ODP is other disproportional mechanicms. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The number of firms in the sample with a primary industry code in the 
pharmaceutical industry is quite small, 39 to be precise. Therefore an 
alternative definition of pharmaceutical sector is applied. This 
alternative is defined ‘Health Care’ and is identified by using the 
Nordic Stock Exchange’s definition of the health care sector.16 The 
health care sector is referred to as the pharmaceutical sector through-
out this chapter. TABLE 5.1 compares numbers and proportions of 
firms with disproportional ownership structures in the pharmaceutical 
industry with all other industries. The total number of pharmaceutical 
firms is 79. In TABLE 5.1 this group of firms is labeled ‘Pharma’ , 
whereas all other industries are referred to as ‘Non-pharma’. 
 
Focusing on the reported shares in TABLE 5.1 pharmaceutical firms has 
a slightly larger share of firms with disproportional ownership 
structures, around 50 per cent compared to 39 per cent for non-
pharmaceutical firms. Across the legal regions, only Common Law has 
a higher proportion of disproportional ownership structures in non-
pharmaceutical firms compared to pharmaceutical firms.  
                                          
 
 
16 The industry codes include SIC industry codes:2830-9 ‘Drugs’, 3821 ‘Laboratory Apparatus and 
Furniture’, 3841 ‘Surgical and Medical Instruments and Apparatus’, 3842 ‘Orthopedic, Prosthetic, 
and Surgical Appliances and Supplies’, 5047 ‘Medical, Dental, and Hospital Equipment and Supplies’, 
8071 ‘Medical Laboratories’, and 8731 ‘Commercial Physical and Biological Research’. 
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TABLE 5.2 LARGEST OWNER’S CONTROL AND DEGREE OF 
DISPROPORTIONALITY, THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR 
  Median votes 
Median degree of  
disproportionality 
Pharma Per cent Percentage points 
   PP 20.75 0.0 
   DP 30.56 13.55 
   DCS 35.88 18.01 
   PYR 24.66 5.26 
Non-pharma   
   PP 34.45 0.0 
   DP 31.87 9.45 
   DCS 30.72 9.94 
   PYR 32.35 6.98 
Note: PP is proportional, DP is disproportionality, DCS is dual class shares, PYR is pyramids. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
TABLE 5.1 also shows that the use of mechanisms to separate control 
and income rights in all countries are distributed equally across dual 
class shares and pyramids for pharmaceutical firms. This is similar to 
firms outside the pharmaceutical industry. Dual class shares are 
commonly used in the Scandinavian countries and Germany, whereas 
the use of pyramids dominates in countries with French legal origin 
and common law. We therefore again observe that Scandinavian firms 
within the pharmaceutical sector tend to rely more on dual class 
shares than firms in other countries. Moreover, pharmaceutical firms 
from countries with a French legal origin use pyramids more 
frequently than in any other region. This is contrary to the general 
analysis, which showed that the use of dual class shares varied 
significantly across countries, whereas the use of pyramids was 
relatively constant.  
 
TABLE 5.2 looks at the concentration of control and the degree of 
disproportionality in the pharmaceutical sector relative to non-
pharmaceutical firms. TABLE 5.2 shows that the concentration of votes 
is significantly lower for proportionally owned pharmaceutical firms 
compared to firms with disproportional ownership structures. This 
difference is mainly explained by the relatively high concentration of 
pharmaceutical firms with proportional ownership structures in the 
common law and the Scandinavian countries, where control is less 
concentrated. For disproportionally owned firms the control rights are 
not different when we compare pharmaceutical to non-pharmaceutical 
firms. However, firms with dual class shares have slightly more 
concentrated control in the pharmaceutical industry compared to 
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other industries. Once again the geographical location might explain 
this difference. Pharmaceutical firms with dual class shares are mainly 
present in Germany and Scandinavia, where the separation of control 
and income rights is high. This effect is evident when we focus on the 
third column in TABLE 5.2, which shows the median degree of 
disproportionality conditional on the disproportionality mechanism. 
The difference across industries in the wedge between voting and 
income rights for firms with disproportional ownership is driven by 
firms with dual class shares. Again, this difference can be explained 
by the regional differences in the use of mechanisms separating 
voting and income rights. 
 
5.2 Firm performance with focus on 
pharmaceutical sector 
This section focuses on the economic situation of pharmaceutical 
relative to non-pharmaceutical firms. As in Chapter 4 the indicators 
used are: firm value (market to book value), operating performance 
(return on assets), and growth in sales and number of employees. 
With respect to the two latter measures of firm performance, the 
caveats from the prior analysis apply: Our growth measures do not 
distinguish between organic growth and growth through merger and 
acquisitions. Therefore, these results should be interpreted with 
caution. 
 
TABLE 5.3 and TABLE 5.4 show performance for the pharmaceutical 
industry as well as for other industries. First thing to notice is the 
superior performance of the pharmaceutical sector in general. Market 
to book value is much higher than for other industries; sales and 
employment growth are significantly higher whether firms are 
proportionally owned or not; only return on assets provides a mixed 
picture of the relative performance of the pharmaceutical sector, 
although return on assets might be downwards biased by the inclusion 
of biotechnological companies, which are characterized by high cash 
expenditures on research and development and small current sales, in 
the definition of the pharmaceutical industry.    
 
Concentrating on the differences within the pharmaceutical industry, 
TABLE 5.3 reveals that the market to book ratio is lower for firms with 
disproportional ownership structures than for firms with proportional 
ownership structure. However, opposite to the general result, 
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pharmaceutical firms with dual class shares have higher firm value 
compared to firms with pyramidal ownership. This pattern is 
independent of whether mean or median firm values are the centre of 
attention. 
 
TABLE 5.3 also shows that pharmaceutical firms with proportional 
ownership have negative operating performance for both the mean 
and the median return on assets. This result is partly driven by the 
definition of the pharmaceutical sector, which includes 
biotechnological firms, where the main activity is research and 
development of new drugs. R&D expenditures reduce (current) return 
on assets in these firms, which also explains the relatively large 
difference between mean and median return on assets for 
pharmaceutical firms with proportional ownership structures. 
Restricting the sample to the core of the pharmaceutical industry (39 
firms) leads to the finding of a positive return on assets for 
proportionally owned firms, although the mean is still smaller 
compared to firms with disproportional ownership structures.17 The 
main difference across mechanisms is for mean return on assets, 
where pyramids perform slightly better than dual class shares. 
 
TABLE 5.3 PERFORMANCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR – MARKET-TO-
BOOK RATIO AND RETURN ON ASSETS 
  Market-to-Book   Return on assets 
  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Pharma        
   PP 308 2.7904 1.7431  311 -0.1657 -0.0544
   DP 313 1.9358 1.5495  311 0.0379 0.0637
   DCS 148 2.1606 1.7043  145 0.0379 0.0708
   PYR 126 1.8693 1.5512  127 0.0551 0.0804
Non-pharma        
   PP 16,012 1.1406 0.8329  15,932 0.0301 0.0437
   DP 10,500 1.0489 0.8298  10,542 0.0423 0.0450
   DCS 4,823 0.9772 0.8022  4,856 0.0400 0.0437
   PYR 4,084 1.1780 0.8595   4,079 0.0465 0.0469
Note: See note to TABLE 5.2. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
17 These results are available on request. The small sample size increases uncertainty. 
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TABLE 5.4 PERFORMANCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR – SALES AND 
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 
  Sales growth  Employment growth 
  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Pharma        
   PP 284 0.1645 0.1116  269 0.0556 0.0511 
   DP 282 0.0862 0.0545  274 0.0442 0.0310 
   DCS 133 0.1028 0.0526  130 0.0476 0.0321 
   PYR 114 0.0969 0.0748  110 0.0561 0.0327 
Non-pharma        
   PP 14,333 0.0579 0.0569  12,843 0.0319 0.0114 
   DP 9,353 0.0532 0.0480  8,293 0.0236 0.0088 
   DCS 4,325 0.0508 0.0490  3,825 0.0169 0.0099 
   PYR 3,603 0.0600 0.0493  3,182 0.0324 0.0110 
Note: See note to TABLE 5.2. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Results on growth in sales and employment are reported in TABLE 5.4. 
The mean (yearly) sales growth rate is much higher than the median 
due to some extraneous large sales growth rates within the pharma-
ceutical industry. Firms with proportional ownership structures have 
experienced higher growth in terms of sales. Again, is it worth high-
lighting that this analysis cannot distinguish between organic growth 
and growth through acquisitions. Any difference in growth rates be-
tween firms can potentially be attributed to differences in the ability 
to finance growth through mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, TABLE 
5.4 shows that the difference between mechanisms is less clear as the 
mean points towards higher sales growth for dual class shares, 
whereas the median points towards higher growth for pyramids. TABLE 
5.4 also reports results for the (yearly) employment growth. Again 
proportionally owned firms grow slightly quicker than disproportionally 
owned firms. But given the small sample and the inability to separate 
organic and takeover growth, this result is probably not robust.  
 
In TABLE 5.5 growth in market to book ratio is negative for 
proportionally owned firms and positive for disproportionally owned 
firms on average and for the median firm. 
 
TABLE 5.5 PERFORMANCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR – MARKET TO 
BOOK VALUE GROWTH 
Ownership structure N Mean Median 
Proportional 143 -0.0555 -0.0109 
Disproportional 117 0.0333 0.0299 
Dual Class Share 63 0.0485 0.0548 
Pyramid 60 0.0198 -0.0023 
Source: Own calculations 
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To complete the analysis of the pharmaceutical sector, TABLE 5.6 
shows estimates from regressions with the five measures of firm 
performance as dependent variables. Compared to the analysis in 
Chapter 4, industry controls are excluded, but the empirical model still 
contains controls for country, year and firm characteristics. In TABLE 
5.6 the results for firms with disproportional ownership structure are 
reported. The effect on market to book ratio looks much higher than 
prior estimates. However, the average market to book ratio is much 
higher for firms in thee pharmaceutical industry. The parameter 
estimate in TABLE 5.6 of 0.199 translates into an effect equivalent to 
7.1 per cent higher firm value for disproportionally owned firms.  
 
More interestingly TABLE 5.6  shows a large positive effect of 
disproportional ownership on return on assets in the pharmaceutical 
industry, which was expected given that proportionally owned firms 
appeared to have negative return on assets on average.  
 
The sign of disproportionality on employment is positive whereas the 
sign on sales growth is negative in TABLE 5.6. However, the estimates 
are also insignificant. 
 
In TABLE 5.7 the effect of each mechanism on firm performance and 
outcomes is reported. The results point towards that the positive 
effect on the market to book ratio is driven by firms with dual class 
shares. The effect on return on assets is positive and significant for 
only pyramids. Finally, TABLE 5.7 shows that the results for sales, 
employment and market value growth are insignificant. 
 
TABLE 5.6 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DISPROPORTIONAL OWNERSHIP ON 
PERFORMANCE – THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR 
  MB RoA SG EG MBG 
DP 0.199 0.101 -0.105 0.008 0.015
 (0.65) (3.25) (0.93) (0.15) (0.20) 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: MB is market to book ratio. RoA is return on assets, SG is sales growth. EG is 
employment growth. MBG is growth in market to book ratio. DP is disproportional. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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TABLE 5.7 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MECHANISMS TO SEPARATE CASH 
FLOW AND CONTROL – THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR 
  MB RoA SG EG MBG 
DCS 0.897 0.015 0.066 0.083 -0.031 
 (2.37) (0.39) (0.47) (1.31) (0.32) 
PYR -0.307 0.140 -0.178 -0.058 0.044 
 (0.95) (4.28) (1.48) (1.07) (0.53) 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: See note to TABLE 5.6. DCS is dual class shares, PYR is pyramids, ODP is other 
disproportionality. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The results are sensitive. Median regressions confirm the results in 
TABLE 5.7, but in general show much smaller parameter estimates in 
absolute value (result not reported). The effect on market to book 
ratio and return on assets commented upon above both become 
insignificant. This indicates that the results are driven by outliers in 
the very small sample of pharmaceutical firms. 
 
5.3 Summary 
The ownership structure of the pharmaceutical industry shares certain 
similarities with other industries, but also has a number of distinct 
characteristics. The share of firms with disproportional ownership 
structures is slightly higher among pharmaceutical firms, which is 
consistent with the evidence on R&D intensity in Chapter 3. 
Interestingly, the pharmaceutical sector ranks among the most R&D 
intensive industries.  
 
The differences in the use of mechanisms and the degree of 
disproportionality between firms in the pharmaceutical and other 
industries reflect the geographic location of firms within the 
pharmaceutical industry. These differences are primarily driven by 
pharmaceutical firms located in Scandinavia and German legal origin 
countries where the use of dual class shares and a high degree of 
disproportionality are common traits. This further highlights that 
ownership structures in Scandinavia are significantly different 
compared to the rest of Europe.  
 
The analysis of firm performance and outcomes emphasized 
significant differences between the pharmaceutical and other 
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industries. The main difference compared to the general performance 
results from Chapter 4 is the finding that pharmaceutical firms with 
disproportional ownership have higher return on assets compared to 
firms with a proportional ownership structure. Moreover, despite 
potential problems related to the measurement of growth rates, the 
analysis found no significant differences across ownership structures 
for both employment and sales growth. Finally, the general negative 
effect on the market to book ratio for firms with disproportional 
ownership was confirmed for pharmaceutical firms. Contrary to the 
results from Chapter 4, the negative effects on firm value seem to be 
driven by pharmaceutical firms with pyramidal ownership and not 
firms with dual class shares. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
This report has analyzed ownership structures and their effects on 
firms’ economic situation in Europe in three parts. The first part of the 
report provided a descriptive overview of the use of mechanisms to 
separate control and income rights. Across country, firm and industry 
characteristics the following findings emerged: 
• The use of disproportional ownership structures and in 
particular dual class shares varies across countries in Europe.  
• Scandinavia has the largest share of firms with disproportional 
ownership structures driven by a frequent use of dual class 
share. 
• The share of firms with disproportional ownership is highest for 
large firms and for firms within research and development 
intensive industries. 
 
The second part of this report focused on the link between ownership 
structures and firms’ economic situation and revealed a number of 
interesting patterns: 
• Disproportional ownership structures are associated with a 
value discount. This value discount is mainly driven by firms 
with dual class shares. 
• The effect of disproportional ownership structures on return on 
assets is insignificant. The effect of disproportional ownership 
on the growth in the market-to-book ration is positive. 
• Firms with disproportional ownership structures have lower 
growth measured by both sales and number of employees. 
However, a clear interpretation of these results is hindered by 
insufficient to data to distinguish between organic growth and 
growth through merger and acquisitions. 
• Even though firms in research and development intensive 
industries have higher firm value, the effect is smaller for firms 
with disproportional ownership structures. The opposite holds 
with respect to return on assets.  
 
In the third part of the report the pharmaceutical industry was centre 
of attention. The analysis of differences between pharmaceutical and 
non-pharmaceutical firms provided a number of different insights: 
• Pharmaceutical firms with disproportional ownership structures 
on average have higher return on assets than proportionally 
owned firms.  
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• The employment and sales growth are no different for 
pharmaceutical firms with disproportional ownership 
structures. 
• The value discount on pharmaceutical firms with 
disproportional ownership structures was comparable to the 
general effect found for all firms. However, the value discount 
seems to be driven by pharmaceutical firms with pyramidal 
ownership rather than firms with dual class shares. 
 
One important caveat to these results is that the number of 
pharmaceutical firms is relatively small. 
 
The results of the analyses in this report indicate that one cannot on 
the basis of existing data draw any general conclusions on whether 
disproportional ownership is good or bad for firms. On average firms 
with disproportional ownership have a lower market-to-book value 
than firms with proportional ownership. The result appears to be 
generated by firms in low and medium technology industries, as it 
does not extend to high tech industries. Similarly, the effect of 
disproportional ownership on operating performance depends on 
which measure of operating performance is used and which industries 
are considered. Finally, on average firms with disproportional 
ownership experience slower employment and sales growth than firms 
with proportional ownership, but this does not extend to high tech 
firms. 
 
As such, the findings of this report raise some interesting points to 
consider in the European debate on the regulation of ownership 
structures and important topics for future research. 
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